Adil Sultan
Some recent reports in the media have once again brought to the fore the question of the trust deficit between Pakistan and the US — the two main partners in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). For example, some US politicians and Western newspaper reports have on more than one occasion questioned the rationale for providing financial assistance to Pakistan to the tune of $10 billion — alleging that it was a kind of compensation in return for Pakistan’s cooperation in the GWOT. The charge against Pakistan of — not doing enough in return for the US money — is premised fundamentally on a false notion of Pakistan being a client state working only for monetary gains. It appears to be part of an ill conceived US strategy to exert more pressure on the country. Continuous mudslinging and doubting Pakistan’s sincerity not only widens the trust deficit between the two coalition partners but is detrimental to their collective security objectives.
The U-turn in US policy towards South Asia in the post-9/11 period once again made Pakistan a frontline state. To bridge the prevailing trust deficit in the post-Cold War period, senior US officials went out of the way to reiterate the significance of the United States’ strategic ties with Pakistan and have repeatedly pledged to sustain long-term relationship, unlike the previous one in which Pakistan was left alone to clear up the mess. However, “to many Pakistanis, recent events make that commitment sound hollow,” according to a retired US scholar, David O. Smith. Smith believes that the trust deficit is growing and accelerating largely because of four concerns: (1) the fear that the United States will leave Afghanistan prematurely, and in chaos; (2) publicly aired criticism by senior US officials about its poor performance in GWOT; (3) the US-India strategic relationship; (4) and the fear that the United States will return to a coercive certification sanctions regime.
Despite these concerns about the long-term US commitment, Pakistan agreed to play a frontline role in the GWOT and deployed more than 80,000 troops along the Afghanistan border — more than twice as many as NATO did — and lost as many as around 1,000 soldiers, more than the casualties of the entire coalition put together. While there are many critics of Pakistan, does the international community have a strategy to deal with the threat of terrorism minus Pakistan? Is there a nation capable or willing to match Pakistan’s sacrifices on behalf of the international community?
Pakistan did not join the coalition for material gains. Rather, it was to rid the region of the menace of extremism, which is basically an outcome of the US “jihad” against communism. The Pakistani leadership is conversant with the strategic importance that the country has for global security. Quoting Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Hussain Haqqani wrote in his book Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military; “America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America… Pakistan is the pivot of the world, as we are placed…(on) the frontier on which the future position of the world revolves.”
Questions are being raised about billions of dollars transferred to Pakistan during the 2002-07 period. Some reports even suggest that in return for the services rendered by Pakistan in the GWOT, the US government provided Pakistan financial aid but without any tangible results. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report of Jan 11, approximately $10 billion had been transferred to Pakistan from 2002 to 2007, of which $5.716 billion were in the form of Coalition Support Funds (CSF)
The $5.716 billion of reimbursements made by the US in the form of CSF from 2002 to 2007 is part of the Department of Defence programme to reimburse war on terror host partners for the expenditures on logistical, military and other expenses in supporting US operations in Afghanistan. These reimbursements are not Pakistan-specific and include other key cooperating nations, such as Jordan. The rest of the money transferred to Pakistan over the last five years includes economic assistance, including education reforms, providing scholarships and fostering science and technology cooperation between the two countries, fighting terrorism, foreign military assistance, and counter-narcotics funding.
While the CSF and US financial assistance put together does bring out an often flaunted figure of $10 billion, collectively this could not be termed as an aid package. Half of it is reimbursement in the form of CSF — without which there would be no logistic support for US operations in Afghanistan. Conditioning of funds to Pakistan’s performance in the GWOT and accusations of its “not doing enough” may not make a difference for Pakistan but could have a negative impact on the ongoing Operation Enduring Freedom, as Pakistan may not be able to share the burden of the huge financial costs needed for US operations in Afghanistan. The US media presidential hopefuls need to be educated on this.
The US failures in Afghanistan could not be attributed to Pakistan. Pakistan may be a pivotal nation in terms of its support to the coalition efforts in Afghanistan, but any successes or failures within Afghanistan are mainly the responsibility of the coalition partners themselves. If there is a need to do more, then each partner country needs to do more, not just Pakistan.
Challenging the often repeated accusation of not doing enough, the former governor of the North West Frontier Province, Lt Gen (r) Aurakzai aptly remarked that either NATO is trying to hide its own weaknesses by levelling allegations against Pakistan or is refusing to admit the facts. He questioned: “Why did the coalition come to Afghanistan? To find Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar and the Taliban; or for democracy, reconstruction and development, and [to] leave a stable Afghanistan which wouldn’t be vulnerable to terrorists. Tell me, which one of those objectives has been achieved? I went to Kabul … and they are all living in a big bunker with no control over Afghanistan. There is no law and order. The insurgency has become far worse…Is that success?”
Instead of blaming Pakistan for the failures of the international community and widening the trust deficit between the two allies, Smith writes: “The United States needs to bear in mind two salient facts: for the United States, Pakistan is a critical linchpin in the war on terrorism. Its geo-strategic location at the crossroads of Central Asia makes it an indispensable strategic partner now and well into the future.” Pakistan’s destabilisation would not only be detrimental at the regional level but would have serious implications for global security environment.
The writer is an Islamabad based defence analyst pursuing his doctoral studies at Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad. Email: adilsultan66@yahoo.com
Courtesy: The News, 25/3/2008
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