It appears that Kissinger has no faith in the democratic process in Pakistan and believes that the dominating parties will indulge in the same old politics while the army will remain the ultimate power broker
US policy-makers are under increasing pressure to distance themselves from General (retd) Musharraf and embrace the political parties which have prevailed in the recent elections.
While political combinations and permutations are being worked out in Islamabad, the US has accelerated its air attacks on the claimed terrorist abodes. Through such actions, the US is laying down its pre-conditions for future Pak-US relations for whoever comes to power in Islamabad.
The New York Times suggested that the US should look beyond Gen (retd) Musharraf in its editorial “Leaving behind Musharraf” (March 15, 2008). Similarly, the leading voices in American think tanks are getting louder and are pressing upon the Bush Administration to change its Musharraf-centric policy.
Robert Hathaway, director of the Woodrow Wilson Centre’s Asia programme opined that the Bush Administration is not willing to abandon Musharraf “but clearly they have to, in rather dramatic fashion, after what had been their previous practice of putting all of the American eggs in a Musharraf basket.” He believes new realities demand that the US should “deal with Islamabad on a much broader basis if they wish to have any sort of influence in Pakistan.”
The biggest indication came from Henry Kissinger who is understood to be a barometer of policy change in the foreign policy establishment. Professor Immanuel Wallerstein of Yale University acknowledges him as such, in these words: “When [Kissinger] opines, he is both telling us where policy is moving and pushing it slightly in ‘realist’ path, in conjunction with allies in the administration. He is thus preparing us for a shift in policy. He has now written about Pakistan. What is he telling us?”
Professor Wallerstein is referring to Kissinger’s op-ed in the Washington Post last week. In this column, Kissinger argues that US policy-makers should not try to manipulate the near-term political process which is underway in Pakistan. Instead, the US should watch its key interests like safeguarding nuclear weapons and the war on terror. Recent US policy has been to favour a coalition of Musharraf and the civilian parties — a “laudable goal” but not “practical”, Kissinger says.
However, Kissinger’s reasoning for non-intervention is not for the enhancement of the democratic process but a temporary inability of outside forces to have any effect on the immediate outcome of the political games being played in Pakistan.
In his view, Pakistan does not have a civil society and political parties that can pursue a “common good”. Instead, Pakistan’s three power players, the Pakistan People’s Party, the Pakistan Muslim League (N) and the army are all feudalistic (whether in uniform or otherwise). He compares them to Italian city states during the Renaissance which had no concept of “common good” as described by Machiavelli.
It appears that Kissinger has no faith in the democratic process in Pakistan and believes that the dominating parties will indulge in the same old politics while the army will remain the ultimate power broker.
Furthermore, he does not see any danger to core US interests with the ongoing political process in Pakistan. Therefore, he argues that though the US should not dump Gen (retd) Musharraf, it should not help him to overcome his present political problems either. He bluntly says: “The future of President Musharraf will undoubtedly become a major issue as the potential coalition partners seek his removal. It is his task as president — not ours — to manage the consequences of the election.”
After the initial failures of manoeuvring, the US seems to be hinting at abandoning Musharraf in the future. Despite periodic pronouncements of “working with Musharraf”, US diplomats are not doing much to effect the political discourse. They may have acknowledged their failure as suggested by Henry Kissinger. Therefore, Musharraf’s survival is no longer central to US policy in Pakistan.
Gen (retd) Musharraf may not be indispensable, however, a recent agreement he signed is considered pivotal for the US war against terrorism. According to this agreement the US can increase its use of Pakistani air bases for monitoring and attacking terrorist centres. By using drones to attack Islamist abodes more frequently after Pakistani elections, the US is setting the pre-conditions for the incoming government.
Probably, the new government will have no choice but to accept these agreements. Pakistan’s security and economic conditions can hardly afford a confrontation with the US.
The way that the major political parties are keeping mum on such attacks means that the new government will cooperate with the US, at least as much as Gen (retd) Musharraf. Therefore, the US has no reason to keep sticking with Musharraf at the expense of alienating the political parties.
Gen (retd) Musharraf’s departure is destined. The question is whether he will take an honourable exit or is impeached.
The writer can be reached at manzurejaz@yahoo.com
Courtesy: Daily Times, 19/3/2008
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